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I N F O R M A T I O N S 
CHANGEMENTS TECHNOLOGIQUES ET 
CONVENTION COLLECTIVE 
L E RAPPORT FREEDMAN 
Le texte ici présenté reproduit de larges extraits du Rapport de ia Com-
mission d'enquête constituée de l'Honorable Juge Samuel Freedman, de la 
Cour d'Appel du Manitoba, en marge d'événements récents survenus en 
rapport avec la politique des Chemins de fer nationaux (C.N.R.) relativement 
aux parcours prolongés. 
Ce rapport revêt une importance considérable pour l'avenir des relations du 
travail au Canada en ce qu'il interprète, à l'occasion du cas précis qu'il 
étudie, les droits de la direction des entreprises en matière de changements 
technologiques, et qu'il dégage le principe général à l'effet que, nonobstant 
l'état actuel du droit et de la pratique en relations industrielles chez-nous, 
l'employeur ne peut décider seul en une telle matière, laquelle devrait être 
l'objet de négociation entre les parties intéressées, et donner ouverture aux 
mécanismes et aux recours prévus par les lois du travail pour la solution des 
conflits d'intérêts, en cas de mésentente. 
Si la mésentente survient pendant la durée d'une convention collective, le 
Rapport Freedman suggère qu'une distinction soit faite entre les changements 
technologiques mineurs, ne touchant pas de façon substantielle le régime du 
travail, et les changements majeurs de nature à altérer considérablement 
ce régime. 
Afin d'établir cette distinction, il suggère la procédure de l'arbitrage obliga-
toire. Si la décision est à l'effet qu'il s'agit d'un changement mineur, l'em-
ployeur pourrait y procéder immédiatement ; si au contraire, il est décidé 
que le changement en est un majeur, l'employeur ne pourrait le mettre à 
exécution durant le cours de la convention collective existante et le problème 
deviendrait matière à négociation lors des pourparlers en vue du renouvelle-
ment de cette dernière, comme toute autre matière faisant l'objet de ces 
pourparlers. 
Nature et historique du problème 
1. Le problème que constituent les parcours prolongés sous leur aspect présent et 
dans leurs dimensions actuelles est avant tout une conséquence technologique. L'avènement 
du moteur diesel et les autres progrès technologiques ont permis aux chemins de fer de 
fonctionner sans avoir à changer d'équipe pour une distance plus grande que ce n'était 
possible à l'époque des locomotives à vapeur. (Chapitre 2) 
2. Une étude de la situation au cours d'une période d'au moins six ans montre que 
les parcours prolongés ont été une source de tension entre la main-d'oeuvre et la direction. 
Tous les signes indiquaient qu'il fallait prévoir des difficultés. (Chapitre 3) 
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Comment il faudrait procéder pour instituer 
les parcours prolongés 
3. La Compagnie a le droit, compte tenu des lois actuelles et de l'usage, d'instituer 
des parcours prolongés; la Commission est d'avis, cependant, que la Compagnie ne devrait 
pas continuer à jouir de ce droit. L'institution des parcours prolongés devrait faire l'objet 
de négociations. La situation actuelle, qui permet à la direction d'apporter unilatéralement 
des changements dans les conditions de travail pendant la durée du contrat, constitue une 
injustice manifeste qui appelle l'attention et la rectification. 
De l'avis de la Commission, la Compagnie devrait donner aux Fraternités un avis 
préalable de 30 jours de son intention d'instituer un parcours prolongé comme prélude à la 
négociation à ce sujet. (Chapitre 9) 
4. Les effets des parcours prolongés ne sont pas toujours les mêmes et, pour cette 
raison, la Commission recommande que l'une et l'autre partie aient le droit de demander à 
un arbitre de trancher la question de savoir si un parcours prolongé aura ou non pour effet 
de modifier sensiblement les conditions de travail. Advenant que la conclusion de l'arbitre 
soit négative, la ompagnie serait immédiatement autorisée à mettre à exécution son 
projet de parcours prolongé. Si, d'autre part, le parcours prolongé devait modifier sensible-
ment les conditions de travail, la Compagnie serait tenue (à moins que la Fraternité ne 
consente au parcours prolongé) de retirer son projet jusqu'à l'arrivée de la prochaine 
période régulière de négociation de la convention. L'arbitrage proposé ici serait confié à 
un seul arbitre choisi par les parties, ou, à défaut d'entente entre elles, désigné par le 
ministre du Travail. (Chapitre 9) 
5. A supposer que les parties ne parviennent pas à s'entendre pour donner suite à la 
recommandation de la Commission, des mesures législatives s'imposeraient. On pourrait 
invoquer ou la loi sur les chemins de fer ou la loi sur les relations industrielles et sur les 
enquêtes visant les différends du travail. Dans le dernier cas, il serait possible de prévoir, 
au moyen d'une modification appropriée, que toute innovation, invention ou modification 
d'ordre technologique, proposée par l'employeur, qui porterait sensiblement atteinte aux 
conditions de travail des employés, devrait être remise à plus tard ou faire l'objet de négo-
ciations au moment de la prochaine période de négociations ou être traitée de la même 
façon que s'il s'agissait d'une mesure tombant sous le coup des dispositions du paragra-
pre (2) de l'article 22 de la loi. Cette disposition porte que les parties peuvent, par leur 
convention collective, renvoyer l'étude d'une question à plus tard, et elles ont encore le droit 
de faire la grève ou de déclarer le lock-out relativement au règlement de ce problème, 
après qu'elles se sont conformées aux dispositions de la loi relatives à la conciliation obliga-
toire. Une modification de la loi sur les relations industrielles et sur les enquêtes visant les 
différends du travail aurait l'avantage de combler une lacune que les progrès technologiques 
ont fait voir dans la loi. (Chapitre 9) 
Obligations de la Compagnie envers les employés 
6. La Commission est d'avis qu'il incombe à la Compagnie de prendre des mesures 
raisonnables pour réduire au minimum les effets défavorables qu'un tel parcours prolongé 
pourrait avoir sur les employés. Cette obligation tire sa source du principe selon lequel, 
lorsqu'on procède à un changement technologique, le fardeau des mesures raisonnables desti-
nées à protéger les employés contre les conséquences défavorables que comporte ce change-
ment doit naturellement être imputé sur le compte des avantages et des épargnes qui en 
découleront. (Chapitre 10) 
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7. La Commission recommande que tout employé obligé de déménager parce qu'un 
parcours est prolongé doit recevoir de la Compagnie une indemnité pour la perte d'argent 
subie dans la vente de sa maison à un prix inférieur à sa juste valeur. 
Si l'employé forcé de déménager n'est pas propriétaire de la maison qu'il habite, mais 
qu'il l'occupe en vertu d'un bail non expiré, la Compagnie devrait le protéger contre les 
pertes financières qu'il subit parce qu'il doit mettre fin à ce bail. (Chapitre 10) 
8. Au sujet des frais de déplacement découlant de l'institution des parcours prolongés, 
la Compagnie recommande que les privilèges relatifs au déménagement des effets mobiliers 
vaillent pour le déménagement d'une maison à l'autre, non pas seulement d'une gare à 
l'autre. (Chapitre 10) 
9. Un employé qui a été au service de la Compagnie pendant au moins un an et qui 
perd son emploi en raison de l'établissement d'un parcours prolongé devrait avoir droit de 
recevoir une indemnité de licenciement ou une somme globale comme allocation de départ, 
selon les dispositions de la loi sur le National-Canadien et le Pacifique-Canadien, dont il 
est fait mention d'une façon plus précise dans le chapitre 6 du rapport. (Chapitre 10) 
Obligations de la Compagnie envers les collectivités 
10. De l'avis de la Commission, les obligations de la Compagnie envers les collectivités 
découlent d'un civisme bien compris, ce que le National-Canadien reconnaît lui-même. 
L'application pratique de ce principe exige que la Compagnie accorde une attention parti-
culère aux questions suivantes: moment et échelonnement du changement, préavis suffisant, 
et assistance technique pour aider la collectivité à s'adapter aux effets du changement. 
(Chapitre 10) 
11. Au sujet des parcours prolongés, deux principes contradictoires de la Compagnie 
semblaient en conflit. D'une part, il s'agissait du principe des préavis aux localités et, 
d'autre part, du principe du silence, de peur qu'une information hâtive suscitât du malaise 
et de l'agitation. La Commission exprime son approbation du premier et sa désapprobation 
du second. (Chapitre 10) 
Obligations des syndicats envers les collectivités 
12. Un civisme bien compris de la part des syndicats est tout aussi nécessaire que le 
devoir correspondant imposé aux compagnies. Ces obligations exigent qu'on reconnaisse ceci: 
le changement est une loi de la vie et une résistance acharnée au progrès technologique 
nuit à tout le monde, y compris les travailleurs. (Chapitre 10) 
13. Par suite de plaintes selon lesquelles le régime d'ancienneté pêche par un certain 
manque de souplesse, la Commission recommande que les Fraternités étudient le régime 
applicable à leurs membres en vue d'y introduire une mesure plus grande de souplesse 
n'entrant pas en conflit avec l'objectif général de ce régime. (Chapitre 10) 
Obligations de l'Etat envers les collectivités 
14. La Commission est d'avis qu'un gouvernement a des obligations envers les collec-
tivités dont l'existance ou la stabilité sont menacées par un parcours prolongé ou ses consé-
quences. (Chapitre 10) 
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15. La Compagnie devrait donner un avis de 30 jours de son intention d'instituer un 
parcours prolongé à l'autorité compétente de la collectivité ou des collectivités intéressées 
La collectivité devrait, pendant cette période de 30 jours, jouir du droit de demander à la 
Commission des transports du Canada (ou, au choix, à l'Administration de l'organisation 
rationnelle des embranchements dont on recommande la formation dans le rapport de la 
Commission royale d'enquête sur les transports, advenant que celle-ci soit créée) de l'en-
tendre au sujet du projet du parcours prolongé de la Compagnie. L'objet essentiel d'une 
telle étude serait de décider si le moment choisi par la Compagnie pour exécuter son projet 
et les étapes de cette exécution sont raisonnables ou non. La Commission des transports 
(ou l'Administration) étudierait le contrecoup probable sur la localité du parcours prolongé 
envisagé en vue de déterminer non pas s'il y a lieu ou non d'instituer le parcours prolongé, 
mais plutôt la façon et le moment de l'instituer. (Chapitre 10) 
16. Quand l'intérêt public exige un délai, l'Etat, au nom de l'intérêt public, doit en 
faire les frais. Dans la pratique, cela veut dire qu'il faudrait, au moyen des deniers publics, 
rembourser la Compagnie de toute perte qu'elle subit en obéissant à l'ordre de la Commission 
des transports (ou de l'Administration) de retarder son projet. (Chapitre 10) 
17. Après l'institution d'un parcours prolongé, le pays conserverait des obligations 
envers la localité qui en subit le contrecoup. Cette responsabilité existerait à la fois à 
l'échelon provincial et à l'échelon fédéral et devrait être partagée en conséquence. (Chapi-
tre 10) 
18. Malheureusement, il est impossible de garantir le maintien d'une collectivité dans 
son état actuel. En conséquence, en proposant des sauvegardes à l'intention des collecti-
vités, la Commission n'a pas pour objet d'empêcher les parcours prolongés, mais seulement 
de les retarder pendant une période raisonnable pour permettre l'adaptation aux effets de 
celui-ci. (Chapitre 10) 
Répercussions du progrès technologique 
sur l'économie et sur les hommes 
36. La dieselisation et d'autre changements d'ordre technologique ont contribué à la 
réduction de l'emploi aux chemins de fer. (Chapitre 8) 
37. Les parcours prolongés sur le National-Canadien s'accompagneraient de réduc-
tions et de bouleversements de l'emploi. Ce sont là les conséquences, du point de vue des 
hommes; et la suppression ou la réduction de leurs effets est la tâche à laquelle doivent 
s'employer en collaboration la direction, le travail et le gouvernement. (Chapitre 8) 
Généralités 
38. Le rapport de la Commission est conçu en fonction des parcours prolongés et, 
chaque fois que cela se peut, en fonction de situations semblables. Cependant, prédire la 
nature des situations et dire de quelle façon elles pourraient se présenter à l'avenir serait 
hasardeux et la Commission ne se croit pas tenue de le faire. (Chapitre 11 ) 
39. La Compagnie et les Fraternités doivent être prêtes à faire des concessions dans 
l'intérêt de la paix industrielle à l'avenir. La Compagnie doit se faire à l'idée, désagréable 
peut-être mais nécessaire, qu'il faut négocier les parcours prolongés. Les Fraternités doivent 
cesser de penser que les parcours prolongés n'ont pas leur raison d'être et envisager les 
négociations d'une façon raisonnable et réfléchie. Dans cet esprit de coopération et de 
confiance mutuelle, la cause de la Compagnie, des employés et du pays sera bien servie 
et progressera. (Chapitre 11) 
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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
THE FREEDMAN REPORT 
Introduction 
1. On Sunday, October 25th, 1964, the Canadien National Railways attempted to put 
into effect a plan for extended crew runs through the terminais of Nakina, Ontario and 
Wainwright, Alberto. The plan encountered large-scale résistance from its running trode 
employées. This résistance took the form of booking off sick, a device in which over 2800 
employées of the company participated. The men returned to work after the Prime Minister 
of Canada announced on October 26th that a Commission would be appointed to examine 
the C.N.R/s run-through proposais. That was the genesis of the présent Commission. 
2. Although the Inquiry evoked widespread interest and produced an abundance of 
witnesses, it began and it ended largely as a dispute between two parties — the C.N.R., 
on the one hand, the running trade Brotherhoods, on the other. Thèse are the Brotherhood 
of Locomotive Engineers (B.L.E.), the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen 
(B.L.F. & E.), and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (B.R.T.). 
3. Following a preliminary meeting dealing with procédure the Commission extended 
an invitation to the Canadian Pacific Railway to participate in the proceedings. That company, 
after considération, reached the conclusion that the terms of référence of the Commission, 
as set out in the apointment, did not exend to or include the Canadian Pacific Railway. 
It accordingly did not accept the invitation to participate. 
The Nature of the Problem 
4. Essentially the run-through is a product of technological advance. That there were 
some run-throughs in the steam engine days is indeed the case. But the run-through problem 
in its contemporary aspect and in its présent dimension is primarily an outgrowth of tech-
nology. 
5. The steam engine needed servicing every 125 miles or so. In response to that need 
railway terminais were established or developd at distances of approximately 125 miles. 
Crews would run, especially in freight service, from one terminal to another over that 
distance. The coming of the diesel, along with other technological advances, has made it 
possible for the railway to run well beyond the former distance without a change of crew. 
To expedite its service and to reduce its operating costs the company wishes to run through 
the intermediate terminais by extending the length of its crew runs. 
But a run-through brings conséquences to the employées of the company. It also has 
an impact upon a community. The problem is one of satisfying the compan/s very legitimate 
objective of progressing with the times and being fully efficient, without unnecessarily 
impairing the rights of men and communities who might be adversely affected in the 
process. The problem in short is one of making a reconciliation between économie progress 
and human security. 
The Background of the Problem 
6. The crisis of October 25th, 1964, cannot be understood in isolation. It must be 
viewed against a background of events extending over a period of at least six years. Thèse 
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events reveal the fissure which was gradually developing between the Company of the 
Brotherhoods on the issue of run-throughs. Its source was the profound concern of the men 
in the Brotherhoods that run-throughs, and other railway plans flowing from the new 
technology, would bring about changes in their working conditions, sornetimes very great 
changes, and probably also a réduction in jobs. They accordingly felt that such plans should 
not be instituted without prior negotiation between the company and the designated 
représentatives of the Brotherhoods. 
7. In the years between 1958 and 1964 the run-through issue grew in intensity as a 
factor dividing the parties. The institution of some run-throughs and the proposed institution 
of others found management and the Brotherhoods assuming the posture of antagonists. An 
examination of the record reveals certain issues as coming to the fore — the propriety or 
otherwise of management unilateraliy bringing about changes in working conditions; the 
daim that this involved a departure from principles of collective bargaining, the assertion 
that the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act contained a gap in that 
it permitted management to change conditions of employment during the contract period; 
and the refusai of the company to provide compensation for losses on real estate suffered 
by men dislocated by a run-through. 
8. More than once the matter found its way to Ottawa. In May, 1963, a délégation 
of the unofficial Joint Running Trades Association presented to a group of Members of 
Parliament, including three Cabinet Ministers, a brief in opposition to the C.N.R/s run-
through plans. Two months later a similar brief was submitted on behalf of the officiai 
running trades Brotherhoods. 
On December 20th, 1963, the Standing Committee on Railways, Canals and Telegraph 
Lines, after many hearings extending over several months, reported favourably on Bill C-15, 
An Act to amend the Railway Act (Responsibility for Dislocation Costs). I t recommended 
that the government give considération to amending Section 182 of the Railway Act (dealing 
with compensation to employées for financial loss caused by change of résidence necessitated 
by the company's closing of a station or divisional point) to make it applicable, among 
other things, to run-throughs. 
9. A study of the background shows that run-throughs were a source of tension 
between labour and management. Ail signs pointed to potential trouble ahead. They were 
a warning, or should hâve been a warning, to the company to handle the run-through issue 
with spécial care and circumspection. It would appear, however, that the company was less 
conscious than it ought to hâve been of the depth of resentment which run-throughs 
produced and of the threat to good labour-management relations which they presented. 
The company looked mainly to the fact that some run-throughs had been introduced and, 
despite initial opposition from the men, appeared now to be operating satisfactorily. Thus 
the stage was set for Nakina and Wainwright. 
The Opérational Aspects of Run-throughs 
10. The Brotherhoods challenged the view that run-throughs were justified as a railway 
opération. They urged that the savings they would effect, in time or money, would be 
miniscule. Against such minor benefits would hâve to be weighed the increased hazards 
which such opérations would entail, hazards resulting from long runs, greater fatigue, and 
the like. The Commission was accordingly invited to condemn the run-through as an 
undesirable railway opération. 
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11. Are run-throughs warranted on operational grounds ? In support of its case that 
they are, Canadian National took GS its starting point the highiy compétitive environment 
which has characterized the transportation industry since the end of the Second World War. 
The intensity of compétition has compelled the company to look for every possible means 
of achieving greater efficiency in its opérations and of reducing costs. 
12. A run-through expedites service by eliminating needless delays. The Commission 
was exposed to a variety of estimâtes as to the length of time involved in a crew change. 
Assessing as fairly as it can the mass of controversial évidence that has been offered on 
this subject, the Commission finds that a saving of 10 minutes as a resuit of a run-through 
is realistic and crédible. 
I t is clear from a statement filed by the company pursuant to the direction of the 
Commission that for the immediately foreseeable future what is involved in the company's 
plan is not two run-throughs but rather fifteen. The 10-minute saving at a terminal 
accordingly takes an added significance when the full run-through program is envisaged 
Moreover, the saving of time at the terminal, although itself important, is not the only 
benefit. A greater fluidity is given to the service in gênerai, for example, in arranging 
for a « meet » of trains. 
13. A run-through will resuit in the saving of money by the company. In the case of 
Nakina the annual saving was shown to be $102,772.00; for Wainwright it was $145,254.00. 
For the company's full run-through program over the next three to five years a total annual 
saving of between $850,000.00 and $875,000.00 was suggested as likely. Indeed one witness 
thought that a figure of one million dollars annually would be nearer to the mark, and the 
Commission believes that this is not an exaggerated estimate. 
14. Stressing the factor of safety the Brotherhoods complained that the company's 
proposed opération would necessarily entail longer hours on duty, with résultant fatigue, and 
with conséquent danger of accident. The Commission shares the anxiety of the company 
and the Brotherhoods that runs should be safe. But it notes that the law already has made 
provision for protection of the public and the men in this very area. Section 290(1) (j) 
of the Railway Act empowers the Board of Transport Commissioners for Canada to make 
orders and régulations "limiting or regulating the hours of duty of any employées or class 
or classes of employées, with a view to the safety of the public and of employées». From 
the évidence the Commission discovered that the Brotherhoods had deliberately elected not 
to ask the Board for such an order but to leave the matter as it stood under existing rules, 
which provided that « the men are to be the judges of their own condition ». 
In this situation the Commission would be justified in saying that the vigorous attack 
on run-throughs, based on long hours on duty, was misdirected. I t should hâve been addressed 
to the Board rather than to the Commission. A policy of deliberate refusai to invite the 
Board of Transport Commissioners to act under its statutory authority and of reliance 
instead on the provisions worked out in the collective agreement affords poor support for 
the position now taken by the Brotherhoods. 
But the Cmmission does not wish to leave the matter in that way. Dealing with the 
merits of the attack which the Brotherhoods mounted against run-throughs on grounds of 
safety, and viewing the évidence on this issue in its entirety, the Commission is not prepared 
to condemn the run-through as a dangerous opération or to say that it violâtes canons of 
safety. Some run-throughs are already in opération in Canada and many more in the United 
States. If a relationship between run-throughs and accidents existed, some évidence of it 
would hâve found its way to the record. But it did not do so. 
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It may now be appropriate for the Board of Transport Commissioners to take action 
in this area on its own. The Commission therefore recommends that the Board, in the vigilant 
exercise of its statutory powers, survey the entire matter of hours on duty, whether related 
to run-throughs or not, with a view to determining any regulatory action is required, 
and if so, to take such action accordingly. 
15. The Brotherhoods also argued that extended crew runs would bring added discom-
forts to the men. Longer runs would make the work load unbearable, they said. But 
considering ail factors, including time off duty between trips, the Commission finds that this 
contention has not been established. 
A second point concerned the amenities, or lack of them, in cabooses and in diesel 
locomotives. The Commission not only heard much avidence on thèse subjects, but also 
personally inspected several cabooses and rode for some distance in a diesel locomotive. 
The indictment against train facilities and conditions was considerably exaggerated. 
Not that they should not be improved. Indeed they should. But is an inadequately equipped 
caboose an answer to a run-through or is it simply an argument for a better caboose ? 
If the facilities of cabooses and cabs are in need of improvement they should be improved, 
whether trains run over one division or more than one. To say, however, that thèse facilities 
would be tolerable over one division but intolérable over two — and for that reason there 
should be no run-throughs — is to raise against the railway's case a ground of slender 
validity. It is not a ground of sufficient weight to sustain the attack on run-throughs. 
The Commission is accordingly of the view that run-throughs are an appropriate and 
justifiable railway opération. They are not of a character inherently to be condemned. 
They should be instituted — in proper circumstances and under proper safeguards. 
Technological Change — An Economie and Human Problem 
« We are confronted with the problem of how to deal with displacement and 
dislocation, with the need for retraining, with the development of new skills, 
with the survival of an enterprise and the investment of new capital, wïh 
material and human losses, and with the question of how to distribute new 
benefits between wages, social welfare and leisure. Thèse are complex and 
rapidly changing issues which cannot be tackled successfully unless, first, there 
is mutual concern and mutual récognition of the legitimate rôle of each party; 
second, there is realization that neither the responsibility for nor the cost of 
adjustment can be imposed solely upon one of the parties or let fall upon the 
weak; and third, there is a compréhension of the need for objective analysis, 
for information, for prior study, for consultation and foward plonning, and for a 
readiness to deal with realities. » 
Dr. John T. Deutsch, Chairman of the Economie Council 
of Canada, in Proceedings of the National Conférence 
on Labour Management Relations, Ottawa, November 9-10, 
1964, page 5. 
« This differentiation between bénéficiâmes and sufferers from technological 
change présents us with a moral as well as an économie problem. Society as 
a whole is, by and large, a beneficiary. Is it morally acceptable for most of 
us to enjoy the benefits of new technologies without utilizing every possible 
means of minimizing the losses and assisting the readjustment of those who 
are not beneficiaries but sufferers ? Society has a moral obligation to accept 
the cost of necessary programs to this end as a charge against the benefits 
of technological advance. » 
Somers, Cushman, and Weinberg, « Adjusting to Techno-
logical Change», Harper & Row, New York, 1963, p. 207. 
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There is much wisdom in the words above quoted, and the Commission is pleased to 
adopt them as the basis of its approach to the problem now being considered. So well do they 
define that problem and expose its implications that an extended treatment of it by the 
Commission is hardly necessary. This is perhaps a good thing, as the subject of technological 
change has already produced a vast literature, and the Commission has no désire to add 
greatly to its volume. In the briefest form, therefore, référence will be made to the run-
through problem as an aspect of technological change having économie and social 
conséquences. 
Economists tell us that the problem of technological change is not new but that it is 
simply the modem form of a process as o!d as the Industrial Révolution, if not older. 
Nor is it, many of them say, a cause of unemployment ; it is rather a source for the création 
of new jobs. They add that when économie conditions are buoyant and the demand for 
labour is brisk, technological changes can be introduced without any significant disruptive 
effects upon the work force. It is only when the economy is sluggish and when govemment 
action has been inadéquate or ineffective to strenghten it that technological innovations bring 
unfortunate conséquences to individuals. But in such circumstances the villain is not tech-
nology, which is an instrument for industrial progress, but rather govemment, which failed 
in its responsibility to keep the economy healthy and vigorous. 
This thesis is probably sound. The Commission, however, would venture an observation 
concerning its practical application in a spécifie situation. A perfectiy buoyant economy 
in always an idéal but rarely an attainment. When such an economy does not exist (a usual 
situation, one might say) and technological change is introduced with disruptive consé-
quences, a worker whose job has becorne redundant is likely to find little consolation in the 
reflection that he is a victim not of technology but of govemment inaction. For him the 
stark and immédiate fact is that he is jobless. Admittedly if the total demand for labour 
happened to be great he could quickly move into other employment — in which case there 
would be Iess occasion for him to isolate or identify technology as the source of his 
trouble. Very often he might simply be reassigned to another job with the same employer. 
Even then, however, he might be confronted with the need to learn a new kind of work, 
his old skills having been made obsolète by technological advance. Taking a broad, national, 
long-range view and looking at employment in its totality the economists may be justified 
in contending that technology does not cause unemployment. Within the total picture, 
however, technology may bring about individual cases of difficulty and hardship, cases 
which will be multiplied if the gênerai demand for labour is slack. 
Moreover when a job becomes redundant the impact of the change may extend beyond 
those who seem immediately affected by it. A wise and benevolent employer may protect 
the présent job holder either by retaining him in it until his retirement or by assigning him 
to another job. But what of the new entrant into the industry ? For him the former job 
no longer exists. « Silent firing » is what this state of affairs is sometimes called. This new 
member of the labour force may perhaps hâve a différent job available to him. But he 
may hâve to go elsewhere to obtain it, and so even in such case some hardship would resuit 
from the technological change. 
That within the railroad industry in Canada technological change has been accompanied 
by reduced employment cannot be denied. In a submission in 1961 to a Spécial Committee 
of the Senate on Manpower and Employment, The Railway Association of Canada, of which 
the C.N.R. is a member, pointed out that between 1952 and 1959 the railway work force 
declined by 19 per cent. (It has declined further since.) The submission then added the 
following comment: 
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« The chief factors contributing to the décline in railway employment apart 
from the loss of traffic to competitors, hâve been dieselization and other 
technological changes. » 
This is understandably so, since the usual effect of any technological change is to 
reduce the labour content of a given process. 
Canadian National estimated that its run-through program as presently contemplated 
would resuit in a réduction of 54 operating jobs. In addition there would be a réduction of 
some non-operating jobs — 16 for Nakina and Wainwright alone, as we hâve seen. There 
would also be considérable dislocation in jobs, resulting from the compulsion of men to move 
elsewhere to hold work. The company's estimate of such dislocated jobs resulting from the 
run-throughs was 147. Some of thèse planned run-throughs are only partial in nature, 
applying only to a limited number of trains. An extension of the run-through program beyond 
that presently contemplated would naturally increase the dimensions of the problem. What-
ever may be said about basic causes, the simple fact remains that the run-throughs on the 
C.N. would be immediately accompanied by job réductions and job dislocations. Those are 
the conséquences in human terms; and to eliminate or reduce their effect is the task to 
which coopérative efforts of management, labour, and government must be directed. 
One merit of the statement of the case by the economists is that it focuses attention 
upon the responsibility of government to act with vigilance and wisdom in creating conditions 
in which technological change may safely and advantageously be introduced. In that regard 
the rôle of government is at least twofold. it must be concerned on the one hand with 
employment policy — that is to say, with adéquate policies of économie development to 
increase the total demand for labour. It must be concerned on the other hand with man-
power policy — that is to say, with policies of manpower training, retraining and relocation 
to create a flexible and mobile work force with fully developed skills. 
There are many indications in Canada of government awareness of the problem. Apart 
from gênerai policies designed to secure économie stability and development, there has 
been evolved in récent years a whole séries of policies and programs aimed at providing 
greater protection for the individual against the challenges and threats of the technological 
âge. The Manpower Consultative Service, for example, was set up to encourage and assist 
management and unions to use the techniques of joint consultation and objective research 
to prevent unnecessary technological unemployment. Fédéral government assistance is 
available to the extent of one half the costs incurred in such research and in the develop-
ment of programs of adjustment. The Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act 
helps to provide enlarged training facilities, both at the youth and adult level, for the 
purpose of making individuals more adaptable to changing job requirements. It opérâtes 
through various fédéral-provincial training programs. The Manpower Mobility Program is 
designed to provide assistance, through loans and grants, to individuals wishing to move 
to employment beyond commuting distance from their homes. Other policies include the 
sponsorship of labour-management committees in plants and other establishments across 
the country, the Federal-Provincial Farm Labour Program, the Fédéral-Provincial Program 
on Civil Rehabilitation, the Capital Assistance Program, the Agricultural Rehabilitation and 
Development Agency, the Area Development Agency, and the War Against Poverty. Thèse 
and others that might be mentioned reveal a deep commitment on the part of government 
to the task of meeting the challenges arising from the new technology. More can and 
must be done, but a good beginning has been made. In that setting, industry and labour 
ought the more confidently to move forward in coopérative efforts to meet the problem. 
280 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 21, No. 2 
For assuredly there are responsibilities on others besides governments. There was a 
time, in orthodox micro-economic theory, when the entrepreneur could treat ail factors 
of production — land, labour, capital — as commodities which could be purchased in a 
market. His task was simply to assemble thèse factors and constantly to readjust them in the 
combination most favourable to the profit position. A technological innovation might enable 
him to use less of the factors of production to achieve a given end. The introduction of 
the diesel locomotive is one illustration of such an innovation. It enabled old factors of 
production to be released, sometimes to retirement, sometimes to other uses. Steam-
powered locomotives for the most part were released to scrap, and a few to grâce public 
parks as durable monuments of solid utilitarian functionalism, if not always of aesthetic 
delicacy. But what happens when a technological change releases a factor of production 
called labour? Clearly it poses problems not so easily written off or disposed of. The old 
concept of labour as a commodity simply will not suffice ; it is at once wrong and dangerous. 
Hence there is a responsibility upon the entrepreneur who introduces technological change 
to see that it is not effected at the expense of his working force. That is the human aspect 
of the technological challenge, and it must not be ignored. 
There are responsibilities upon labour as well. Perhaps chief among them is not to 
use its organized strength in blind and wilful résistance to technological advances. Labour 
must recognize the constructive rôle of technology in the gênerai welfare and économie 
strength of the nation. Nor should it insist upon unreasonably high rewards or excessive 
safeguards as the price of its acceptance of change. Stubborn opposition to measures of 
progress can only hurt the nation, labour not least of ail. There is a challenge hère to 
labour leadership. The leader of labour who by speech or pen constantly inveighs against 
technology and automation as enemies of man hardens attitudes of résistance among his 
followers, and thereby does a disservice to society. 
There is a further entity to be considered. The human aspect of technological change 
compels a regard for the position of communities. That subject will be examined more 
closely in a later chapter. Hère, where the probiem is simply being viewed in the light of 
gênerai principle, it may suffice to déclare that community integrity is a national asset and 
that if i t is needlessly destroyed or impaired the nation will be the loser. To isolate and 
define responsibility for preserving the integrity of communities is a subtie and intrinsic 
task. It is one, however, which the Commission cannot avoid and to which it will in due 
course turn. 
In an editorial entitled « Machines and Jobs » the Winnipeg Free Press, on June 5, 
1965 wrote as follows: 
« Thus, the first need in the dawning âge of automation is a more enlightened 
and forward-looking attitude in business, labor and govemment, the ruling 
triumvirate of any modem industrial society. 
The basic oroblem, in short, is to keep a just and flexible balance between 
thèse dominant groups in their power and their demands upon a completely 
interdependent community. And this will call for the highest sort of states-
manship not only in the state itself but in ail the other éléments that 
support the state. » 
Managements Right to Institute Run-throughs 
A practical application of the need for enlightenment and statesmanship in dealing 
with technological change is to be found in the manner in which run-throughs are instituted. 
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Canadian National categorically asserts that i t has the right to establish extended crew 
runs. When it attempted to institute the run-throughs at Nakina and Wainwright it was 
acting, it says, in strict accordance with its right to make and implement such a management 
décision. Two questions accordingly must be considered. Does Canadian National hâve the 
right, as part of its management prérogative, to institute run-throughs? i f i t does, should 
it continue to hâve that right ? The issue posed by thèse questions is central to this 
Inquiry. 
The company in its final submission contended that the scope of the Inquiry did not 
extend to an examination into the merits or otherwise of gênerai théories of management, 
such as the theory of residual rights. The Commission takes a différent view of the matter. 
Since the right to institute run-throughs has emerged as one of the issues in this Inquiry, 
anything relevant to that issue properly falls within the Commission^ considération. The 
doctrine of residual rights is one such matter. I t was frequently referred to both in évidence 
and in argument, and the Commission proposes to deal with it. 
Essentially the theory or doctrine of residual rights starts from the view that in the 
absence of a collective agreement management has gênerai managerial rights. When a 
collective agreement is entered into it limits managerial rights, but only to the extent 
expressly stipulated in the agreement. Whatever has not been bargained away remains within 
managements exclusive control, in the same way as before the agreement was made. 
Thus, according to the doctrine, there is a residue of unaffected rights still left with 
management, to be exercised as part of its managerial function. 
There is a deceptive allure about the doctrine. I t appears to be eminently sane and 
reasonable. Since the property and plant belong to management who else but managment 
should run it and make décisions ? True enough, if management by its agreement has 
surrendered a part of its managerial function, that part is lost to i t ; but the residue 
remains. Could anything be more logical ? 
In confessing to certain doubts and misgivings about the adequacy of the doctrine for 
the contemporary industrial scène, the Commission must in fairness record that thèse doubts 
and misgivings do not appear to hâve been shared by the great majority of people who 
hâve been called upon to deal with it in an officiai way. A study of décisions in labour 
arbitration cases shows a distinct numerical prépondérance in favour of the vaiidity of 
the doctrine. To the extent that this body of jurisprudence may be taken as having settled 
the law it undoubtedly fumishes impressive support for those who uphold the theory as 
correct. None the less the Commission still has réservations about the doctrine. I t seems 
to treat too lightly the changes in labour-management relations which hâve been wrought 
by collective bargaining. Professor Bora Laskin (now Mr. Justice Laskin), as Chairman of 
rhe arbitration board in United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 527, 
& Peterboro Lock Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1953) 4 Lab. Arb. Cas. 1499, expressed the 
matter thus: 
« In this board's view, it is a very superficial generalization to contend that 
a collective agreement must be read as limiting an employer's precollective 
bargaining prérogatives only to the extent expressly stipulated. Such a general-
ization ignores completely the climate of employer-employée relations under 
a collective agreement. The change from individual to collective bargaining 
is a change in kind and not merely a différence in degree. The introduction 
of a collective bargaining régime involves the acceptance by the parties of 
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assumptions which are entirely alien to an era of individual bargaining. Hence, 
any attempt to measure rights and duties in employer-employée relations by 
référence to pre-collective bargaining standards is an attempt to re-enter a 
world which ceased to exist. Just as the period of individual bargaining had 
its own common law worked out empirically over many years, so does a collective 
bargaining régime hâve a common law to be invoked to give consistency and 
meaning to the collective agreement on which it is based. » 
This statement of the matter, although expressing a point of view at variance with 
that held by the great majority of arbitrators, ought not to be cavalierly dismissed. In the 
view of the Commission it possesses great merit and demands serious attention, the more 
so in an âge marked by technological change. 
Canadian National does not say that it relies on the theory of residual rights. Certainly 
during this Inquiry it seemed to be consciously avoiding any explicit identification with 
it — at least, with it under that name. Instead there were références to the company's 
« inhérent » rights. What are inhérent rights of management ? They were not defined. 
Presumably they would include ail those rights traditionally exercised by an entrepreneur 
and gênerai ly asknowledged to fall within his prérogative as owner. Ail those rights, that 
is, except such as had been lost by agreement or otherwise. If Canadian National uses the 
term « inhérent rights » as meaning its innate, historic, or traditional rights it must also 
recognize that certain inroads hâve been made upon those rights by the collective agree-
ments. Its inhérent rights would accordingly consist of the untouched balance of those rights 
after allowing for the full play of the agreements. In short, its inhérent rights would be 
its residual rights, or something very close to that. The terminology may be différent but 
the substance is very much the same in both cases. 
The company's position on the question of managements right to institute extended 
crew runs was conveyed to the Commission through the testimony of Mr. Norman J. 
MacMillan, its Executive Vice-Président. He was a good witness — able, informed, articulate. 
Part of his testimony consisted of a written brief upon the topic. I t put the company's 
case with lucidity and force. 
Looking at Mr. MacMillan's évidence the Commission discems a fourfold basis on 
which the company's case seems to rest. The company daims support for its position by 
virtue of (1) inhérent rights, (2) contract, (3) usage, and (4) law. The first of thèse has 
already been noted. Some référence to each of the other three will now be made. 
Rights under contract are in a sensé the observe of inhérent rights. The latter, unless 
the Commission has misconstrued their meaning, consist of those rights of management left 
unimpaired by the collective agreements. Rights under contract, on the other hand, are 
such as are expressly or impliedly conferred by those agreements. The company contends 
that the collective agreements support its daim that i t is empowered to establish run-
throughs. It does not say that any particular provision in so many words proclaims that the 
company may institute run-throughs. It argues, however, that such a power is implied from 
other things stated in the agreements. Thus the agreements indicate that the company has 
the initiative or responsibiliy to establish or change runs, assignments, or terminais. The 
introduction of a run-through, it says, is merely a variation of runs and terminais, and 
hence must be taken to fall within the company's powers under the agreement. 
An agreement should be construed in such mariner as will give effect to the intention 
of the parties. The Brotherhoods would be surprised to learn that the agreements to which 
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they are a party contain authorization for the company to institute run-throughs. If that is 
their effect it is certainly something the Brotherhoods never intended. In such circumstances 
a tribunal ought not to construe the agreements as producing such a resuit unless clearly 
compelled to do so by the language in which they are expressed. In the présent case the 
Commission feels under no such compulsion, for the terms of the agreement do not clearly 
and necessarily confer on the company the power to establish run-throughs. 
One provision of the agreements may be considered in this connection. It relates to 
terminais, and in the contract with the B.L.E. (Western) it is Article 6.52. I t reads as 
follows: 
« The following stations constitute terminais within the meaning of the term 
and may be eliminated or added to by giving the General Chairman fifeen (15) 
days' notice in writing and bulletining same on the District affected over 
the signature of the General Supen'ntendent of the District. » 
(Then follows a list of terminais.) 
Should a power to establish run-throughs be implied from such a provision ? The 
Commission thinks not. There may be various reasons for eliminating or adding terminais 
quite apart from run-throughs. It would be unreasonable to hold that in agreeing to a 
provision for 15 days' notice for the élimination or addition of terminais, the Brotherhoods 
had thereby consented to a power in the company to institute run-throughs. So too with 
other provisions in the agreement. Indeed the Commission feels that the whole issue of run-
throughs has in récent years been so much in the forefront that i t stands forth as a 
recognizable, independent topic of its own. One would expect i t to be so treated in the 
collective agreements, if dealt with at ail. I t would be most surprising then to find that 
the parties had been entering into agreements on the subject by inadvertance, without 
run-throughs even being mentioned, but simply having to be implied from other provisions 
of a more gênerai character. The Commission is unable to find that this is what occurred. 
Accordingly if management does hâve the right to institute extended crew runs, the source 
of that right must lie somewhere else than in the collective agreements. 
But the relationship between management and its employées does not rest solely upon 
the collective agreements. The company emphasizes this point, as in fact do the Brother-
hoods. And, of course, they are right. The collective agreement was never intended to be an 
all-embracing and exhaustive statement of the relationship. There are other things 
besides — things which may conveniently be grouped together under the heading of custom, 
usage, or practice. Thèse are matters of importance, even though forming no part of the 
written agreements. From time to time both sides will quite properly invoke the authority 
of usage in support of a particular position. The company has invoked that authority in 
support of its daim that it has the right to insitute run-throughs. In the Commission's view 
the company is on stronger ground hère. 
It is a simple fact that Nakina and Wainwright were preceded by other run-throughs. 
Thèse hâve been set forth in Chapter 3 dealing with the background of the problem. That 
they encountered opposition from the Brotherhoods is true. None the less thèse run-throughs 
were established, and after they were established men in the running trades worked on them. 
They are working on them today. In thèse circumstances it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that usage is on the side of the company. 
The Commission is not overlooking the fact that the Brotherhoods on three separate 
occasions challenged management's right to institute the run-through and took their challenge 
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to the Canadian Railway Board of Adjustment No. 1. For to refer to thèse events is not 
enough ; one must also refer to their outcome. In ail three cases the company's position was 
upheld. The Brotherhoods may hâve disagreed with the reasons for the Board's disposition 
of thèse cases. But that is beside the point. Whatever the reasons, the Board's conclusions 
in favour of the company helped to establish a pattern of opérations with regard to run-
throughs. The company was thus enabled to say that usage supported its daim. 
The same thing may be said of the unsuccessful attempt by the Brotherhoods to obtain 
an injunction in 1960 at the time of the Redditt run-through and again at Nakina in 
October, 1964. So too with regard to the attempt, on more than one occasion, of the 
Brotherhoods to obtain a clause in the collective agreement providing for no material 
change or altération in conditions of employment during the currency of the contract 
except by mutual consent. The language of the clause was broad enough to embrace 
matters other than run-throughs ; but it assuredly included run-throughs, which were the 
immédiate occasion why such a clause was sought. But clearly a clause of that kind was 
unnecessary unless management had the right to institute run-throughs on its own. That 
the Brotherhoods sought such a clause constituted récognition of the fact that under existing 
usage and practice the company did hâve such right. 
The company also says that its right to establish extended crew runs dérives from law. 
This claim must be considered in a double sensé, one positive, the other négative. The 
positive side would consist of the existing body of jurisprudence on the subject. It would 
include the décisions of the Conciliation Boards already referred to and the judgments 
of the courts denying the two applications for injunctions to restrain the run-through — the 
one at Redditt, the other at Nakina. I t would also include the décisions in labour arbitration 
cases upholding the doctrine of residual rights. Those décisions, as already stated, constitute 
a decided majority of the cases in which the doctrine came up for considération. Clearly, 
therefore, i t must be found that existing jurisprudence, although not vast in extent, 
furnishes support to the position taken by the company. 
The négative side of the claim is based on the fact that the statute governing the 
company's labour relations with its employées — namely, the Industrial Relations and Disputes 
Investigation Act — provided no impediment to the institution of run-throughs. This Act 
must now be examined, at least in its main features so far as they bear upon the issues 
in this Inquiry. 
Référence has earlier been made to the open period and the closed period of the 
contract. Thèse terms take their meaning from the form and structure of the législation. 
Under the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (certain sections of which 
are set forth in Appendix 6) either party to a collective agreement may, within two months 
before the date of its expiry, by notice require he other party to commence collective 
bargaining with a view to the renewal or revision of the agreement or conclusion of a new 
agreement. The Act requires the parties then to meet without delay and commence collective 
bargaining accordingly. Either party is entitled to request the Minister of Labour to provide 
a Conciliation Officer to help the parties conclude a collective agreement. If the Concilia-
tion Officer should fail to bring about an agreement, the Minister may appoint a Con-
ciliation Board for that purpose. No strike or lockout is permitted until this Board 
has functioned and has submitted its report to the Minister and seven days hâve 
elapsed from the date on which the Minister received this report. The so-called open period 
is deemed to hâve begun with the notice calling upon the other party to commence collective 
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bargaining. It continues in effect until (a) a new collective agreement has been entered into, 
or (b) seven days hâve elapsed after the Minister has received the report of a Conciliation 
Board, whichever is earlier. One further circumstance should be noted concerning the open 
period. While it is in effect the employer may not unilaterally decrease rates of wages or 
alter any other term or condition of employment. 
The closed period commences with the making of a new collective agreement. I t 
continues for the duration of that agreement. Under the statute such an agreement must be 
for a term of at least one year. ( I t may be mentioned that the new agreements made by 
the company with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and with the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen were each for a period of three years from May Ist, 
1964. The agreement with the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was for a period of two 
years from January lst, 1964.) Two matters of significance may be observed in relation 
to the closed period, and thèse may be contrasted with the situation in the open period. 
With an exception not presently material, the right to strike is forbidden during the closed 
period. It is permitted during the open period, subject to compliance with the provisions 
respecting conciliation. The second matter concerns the power of an employer to alter 
conditions of employment. Although this is expressly prohibited during the open period, no 
similar provision is to be found in the Act for the closed period. Hence, except where a 
change in working conditions violâtes the provisions of a collective agreement, an employer 
is not prevented by the Act from altering conditions of employment. 
It is in the light of thèse features of the Act that some of the statements made by 
the company take on meaning. Thus the company has said repeatedly that in establishing 
extended crew runs it did not violate the collective agreements or any applicable law. 
Quite true. For the collective agreements neither authorize nor prohibit run-throughs; 
they are simply silent about them. And since the agreements are silent or> run-throughs, 
the company's institution of them in the closed period would not be a violation of the 
Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, even if their effect was to alter con-
ditions of employment. 
The Commission must accordingly conclude that on the basis of the law as it exists 
todoy the company does hâve the right, as it contends, to institute run-throughs. That 
conclusion at once poses a question: Should it continue to hâve that r ight? 
The question hère raised lies at the heart of this Inquiry. The Commission is satisfied 
that it must be answered only in one way. The institution of run-throughs should be a matter 
for negotiation. To treat it as an unfettered management prérogative will only promote 
unrest, undermine morale, and drive the parties farther and farther apart. In that direction 
lies disorder and danger. By placing run-throughs, on the other hand, within the realm of 
negotiation a long step will be taken towards the goal of industrial peace. More than 
that. Such a course will help to provide safeguards against the undue dislocation and hard-
ship that often resuit from technological change. 
The Commission believes that its answer is rooted in fundamental faimess. Consider 
the situation. A run-through program can not be developed ovemight. Much prior planning 
for it is required. Management is the one to initiate such planning and it alone knows 
where the plan is to take effect and what is its proposed nature and scope. But it does 
not bring its plan to the bargaining table. Under the law it is not required to do so. 
Instead it keeps its plan in reserve, under cover, unmentioned. In that state of affairs 
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bargaining proceeds and a collective agreement is in due course signed. Thereafter manage-
ment for the first time introduces its plan. But now the parties are in the closed period. 
The plan may hâve the effect of causing very material changes in working conditions, as 
was undoubtedly the case at Nakina and, to a lesser extent, at Biggar. But such a 
manoeuvre is not forbidden by the law, provided that the collective agreement itself is not 
violated. The resuit for the men is that they must suffer such a change in their working 
conditions ; and this without recourse, for in the closed period strike action is forbidden. 
Their contract was made on the basis of one set of circumstances. Now it must be 
performed on the basis of another set of circumstances, devised by management alone and 
to which they hâve given no consent. There is a manifest inequity hère which clamours 
for attention and correction. 
But, it may be argued (and was in fact argued by the company) i f protection against 
material changes in working conditions is so important to the men, why did the Brother-
hoods agrée to withdraw the clause providing for such protection ? Why, in other words, 
did the Brotherhoods in their negotiations not insist upon getting this clause even if they 
had to strike to do so ? Mr. W. P. Kelly of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen gave the 
answer to that question, and the Commission found his answer to be persuasive. 
Mr. Kelly prefaced his answer by saying that he never thought he would one day be 
in a witness box having to explain why the Brotherhoods dit not strike. Then, dealing with 
the question itself, he pointed out that when the current contract was being negotiated 
at the end of 1963, no spécifie run-through was facing the men. To call a strike about a 
hypothetical matter which might not actually occur would be foolhardy, and would certainly 
be branded by the public as irresponsible. Moreover the impact of a run-through did not in 
any sensé fall upon ail Brotherhood members equally. Some would be seriously affected. 
others slightly so, and, of course, many not at ail. In such circumstances it would be no 
easy matter to secure gênerai support for a strike, especially with no actual run-through 
announced. Then, too, there was some hope of action through Parliament to remedy the 
problem. Although an earlier Conciliation Board had rejected the Brotherhood's request 
for such a protective clause its Chairman had specifically declared that the solution to 
the problem of technological change might hâve to corne from Parliament itself. Also, more 
recently, the Standing Committee on Railways, Canals and Telegraph Lines had reported 
favourably on Bill C-15 introduced by Mr. Fisher, which was aimed at protecting the rights 
of railway employées in various situations, including specifically run-throughs. In view of 
ail thèse matters Mr. Kelly did not feel that resort to the ultimate sanction of strike action 
was warranted, and the clause was accordingly not insisted upon but was withdrawn. 
Again the Commission would say that this explanation is reasonable and persuasive. 
Run-throughs should be negotiated. It is worth noting that in the United States, they are 
negotiated. Counsel for the company has wamed that the American expérience should not 
be regarded as a safe guide. In the first place, he states, conditions there are différent. 
Railroads in the main are compelled to negotiate the issue of interdivisional runs; they hâve 
not the same freedom in that regard as has the company. For in the United States railroad 
seniority districts are usually coextensive with railway operating divisions. American collec-
tive agreements normally contain prohibions against crews operating beyond their seniority 
districts. If a railway wishes to set up runs with employées operating over more than one 
division, it must first overcome the prohibition in the agreement, and hence must negotiate. 
Therefore, counsel says, American railways hâve been working from the opposite end of the 
problem from that which exists in Canada. A t least from that which exists on Canadian 
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National, the Commission would add, since, as earlier noted, the situation on the Canadian 
Pacific Raiiway appears in some degree to be différent from that on the C.N. 
That conditions in the United States are not parallel with those on Canadian National 
may well be the case. The fact remains, however, that American railways are quite able 
to function under a System in which, voluntarily or otherwise, they negotiate the issue of 
interdivisional runs. No doubt they would prefer to hâve unlimited freedom to establish 
such runs at their own discrétion, since no manager welcomes with enthusiasm any restriction 
upon his sphère of action. The point of significance is, however, that they manage to carry 
on despite the necessity of negotiation — which suggests that fears conjured up by 
management about the dire conséquences that would resuit from any interférence with its 
unilaterial right to institute run-throughs are largely groundless. 
Nor should it be thought that ail railroads in the United States stand in exactly the 
same position with regard to run-throughs. Many of them, it is true, are prevented by agree-
ment or rule from establishing interdivisional runs. Others, on the other hand, are not so 
restricted. So far as concems only matters of contract those in this latter group are deemed 
to possess the right to institute run-throughs. But when they seek to exercise this right 
they hâve to take into account a différent kind of barrier, namely, one imposed not by 
contract but by law. Mr. L. S. Loomis, of Cleveland, Ohio, Assistant Grand Chief Engineer 
of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, explained the matter in the course of his 
testimony thus: Run-throughs normally bring about a change in working conditions. But 
by the seventh clause of Section 2 of The Raiiway Labour Act no carrier is permitted to 
change the working conditions of its employées as a class, except in the manner prescribed 
in the agreement or in Section 6 of the Act. Assuming that the agreement was silent on 
the subject, Section 6 would corne into play. That section provides in such circumstances 
for notice to be given to the représentative of the employées, for the holding of a conférence 
in an effort to arrive at agreement, and for the right of either party to invoke the services 
of the National Médiation Board. In other words, negotiation would take place. So it may 
be said that in the United States railroads do no hâve a unilatéral right to establish 
extended crew runs but that, either as a resuit of contract or through opération of law, 
they are required to negotiate about them. 
Before the Presidential Railroad Commission headed by Judge Simon H. Rifkind the 
carriers proposed the élimination of ail agreements, rules, régulations, interprétations, and 
practices, however established, which prohibited or restricted their right to establish inter-
divisional runs. The Brotherhoods (therein referred to as the Organizations) objected to 
this proposai. The Report of that Commission, published in 1962, had this to say on the 
matter: 
« We are in sympathy with the Organizations' view that the institution of 
interdivisional service and the conditions relating to its establishment are 
legitimate subjects for collective bargaining. Therefore, we reject the proposai 
of the Carriers insofar as it would give management nonreviewable discrétion 
to establish interdivisional service. » 
Nonreviewable discrétion to establish interdivisional service is essentially what Canadian 
National now has, and what it should not hâve. 
With run-throughs continuing to be a matter for negotiation in the United States it is 
of interest to note the wide scope which those négotiations cover. Mr. Loomis brought before 
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the Commission spécifie illustrations of agreements on the subject beween railroads and 
the Brotherhoods. Their range is comprehensive indeed. Counsel for the Brotherhoods in his 
final summation listed some of the matters covered. They include the following: 
—Compensation for losses on homes by men having to relocate themselves ; 
—moving expenses, varying from a bulk payment to the actual demonstrated expenses 
involved ; 
—eating en route ; 
—préservation of the basic day concept; 
—payment for excessive time lost while « sitting » at the terminal which had been run 
through ; 
—provisions for switching rules; 
—run-through opérations involving two districts of two raiiroads; 
—adjustment of road mileage for compensatory purposes; 
—initial and final terminal delays; 
—sleeping accommodation ; 
—spécifie application of certain run-throughs recognizing attrition in certain limited 
situations; 
—restrictions against picking up and setting off in certain localities so as to ensure 
the expédition of freight traffic ; 
—negotiation of interdivisional runs resulting from the merger of two or more railways; 
—consolidation of seniority districts; 
—provision for handling perishable commodities; 
—provision for pilots and for learning the road; 
—provision for deadheading ; 
—transportation to on and off duty points. 
The foregoing list indicates in an impressive and unchallengeable way that negotiation 
can play a fruitful rôle in the run-through issue. 
One further aspect of Mr. Loomis's testimony is worthy of attention. He stated that he 
was unaware of a single strike in the United States which owed its origin solely to a dispute 
about a run-through. 
In advocating the negotiation of run-throughs the Commission has in mind something 
more than mère discussion. A t Nakima and Wainwright the scope of permissible discussion 
was very much restricted, as the Commission has already found. What is required if the 
men are not to feel that they are victims of a plan instead of participants in it is negotiation 
on a basis of parity. Mr. N. J. MacMillan in the course of his testimony said that negotiation 
necessarily carries with it a right of veto. The Commission has little doubt that Mr. 
MacMillan was hère sounding a warning of alarm. Duly warned though it is the Commission 
is not greatly alarmed by the prospect of run-throughs being made a subject of negotiation. 
A power of veto is not necessarily and inherently a vicious thing. It is the irresponsible 
abuse of that power which is vicious and should be condemned. The term « veto » may 
hâve a sinister connotation in an international setting dominated by a cold war. But 
after ail, is it not something which is encountered every day whenever two contracting 
parties sit down to arrive at an acceptable meeting of minds ? One party puts forward a 
suggestion. The other party may accept it, or may reject it, or perhaps accept it in a 
qualified form. In either of the last two instances the second party may be described as 
having exercised a veto. But that is precisely what occurs in the normal process of give and 
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take in every bargaining situation preceding the formation of a contract. Only normally 
we do not stigmatize the process by applying to it the loaded term, veto. 
Certainly there is a risk that the power of negotiation might be abused. The Commission 
believes that risk should be taken — for at least three reasons. The first is that reasonable 
safeguards are discernible against the likelihood that the power would be improperly used. 
The record of the operating Brotherhoods is hardiy one of irresponsibility. During the Inquiry 
the company filed a statement listing the work stoppages, both légal and illégal, which 
had occurred on Canadian National during the past 25 years. Apart from the Nakina and 
Wainwright affair the men in the operating Brotherhoods were involved in only three work 
stoppages, ail of a local and relatively minor character. One concerned men in the B.L.E. 
at Montréal, 90 of whom participated in an illégal waikout which lasted approximately 
24 hours. The second involved about 65 men of the B.L.E. and the B.L.F. £r E. at Vancouver 
who took part in an illégal work stoppage lasting about 48 hours. The third related to the 
B.R.T. and was marked by an illégal sympathy strike on the part of 80 men at Vancouver. 
I t lasted 21 hours. A detailed investigation of the daims and conterclaims lying behind 
thèse three épisodes was not undertaken, as it would hâve led the Commission into unneces-
sary by-paths, away from the road on which it was proceeding. It remains only to add that 
none of the three was related to the run-through problem ; and that in their aggregate they 
represent comparatively minor blemishes on a record which, over a period of a quarter 
of a century, was characterized by reasonableness and responsibility. 
A second reason for taking the risk of negotiation dérives from considérations of 
self-interest. I t is surely important to the Brotherhoods that the railway undertaking of 
which they are a part should be viable and progressive. In its économie well-being they 
hâve a personal stake. Enlightened self-interest accordingly demands that they should not 
stand in the way of its development and progress. Run-throughs, as the Commission has 
already found, hâve a rôle to play in that development, and their institution should not be 
senselessly blocked. That the Brotherhoods, despite their known lack of enthusiasm for 
run-throughs, would cooperate in a run-through program if i t were made a negotiating 
matter is indicated by the following direct exchange which took place between Mr. 
Macdougall, counsel for the company, and Mr. W. P Kelly : 
P. 4559 
« Q. But you are not against the institution of run-throughs ? 
A. We are not opposed to change ; we know there is change, but we want 
some status to sit down and negotiate when it affects the conditions 
of the men we represent. » 
Self-interest, too, should operate as a brake upon the possible abuse of the negotiating 
power. For the Brotherhoods will understand that if they acquire this power it will only be 
because of faith that they will exercise it reasonably and responsibly ; and that they will 
be expected to exercise it in that way and no other. They need hardiy be reminded that 
a power given may also be withdrawn. 
There is yet another reason why the Commission recommends the taking of the risk. 
The alternative is worse. If run-throughs are allowed to remain as a managerial prérogative 
the men will simply continue to feel that they are victims of technology, inert instruments 
in a process beyond their control. Such a situation is fraught with danger. A mood of 
rébellion, already confronted in Nakina and Wainwright, may arise again. No one wants 
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to see the law flouted. Wildcat strikes are at once a défiance of law and a threat to 
industrial peace. As such they are to be condemned, and the Commission does condemn 
them. But how is their récurrence to be avoided ? Surely not by turning one's back on 
something which has proved to be a contributing factor in their development and pretending 
it does not exist. The présent situation goveming the manner in which extended crew runs 
are instituted has been shown to be unfair. A thing which is unfair should be corrected, 
not perpetuated. Risk for risk, the Commission sees greater danger in failing to correct this 
unfaimess thon in acting to bring run-throughs within the realm of negotiation. 
A change from unilatéral control to negotiation would bring with it advantages of a 
positive kind. It would lessen the possibility that the benefits from a run-through program 
would fall largely on one side and its disadvantages largely on the other. I t would strengthen 
the operational aspects of the run-through actually put into effect, since the men who are 
daily concerned with the running of trains would be able, through their représentatives, to 
contribute ideas and suggestions to the common pool. And it would improve the climate of 
labour-management relations and boost morale by the mère process of acknowledging 
the dignity of the individual worker and according to him a voice in décisions affecting the 
conditions under which he is to work. 
None of this involves the renunciation by management of its managerial rôle. That rôle 
is being performed today in the context of collective bargaining. Management still manages 
the business, but periodically it sits down with the représentatives of the men and negotiates 
about wages and conditions of employment. What this Commission suggests is that the 
subject of run-throughs, affecting as it does the working conditions of the men, also belongs 
within the area of negotiation. 
But what happens if in the negotiations the parties are ultimately unable to agrée ? 
One hopes that such occasions would be rare ; but since even the most reasonable of men 
sometimes disagree, a mechanism for resolving such unsettled disputes must be devised. 
The two familiar instruments for dealing with unresolved disputes —• namely, arbitration 
and strike or lockout action — received some attention during the Commission's hearings, 
and something must be said about them. Each has aspects both of strength and of weakness. 
Arbitration — and the Commission is hère referring to the imposed, obligatory, com-
pulsory type — possesses certain features which tend to make it attractive in the public 
eye as a mode of settling labour disputes. Foremost among them is its enshrinement of the 
principle of third party décision. When two disputants are unable to agrée it is at once 
appropriate and fair that the issue between them should be resolved by third part/ arbitra-
ment. A society which esteems the principle of the rule of law and its daily expression 
through the judicial process is bound to look with favour upon arbitration as a method 
of bringing unsettled disputes to a conclusion. And not entirely without reason — for the 
feature of independent judgment by a third party does endow arbiration with positive 
merit. 
But arbitration is subject to certain weaknesses as well. The literature on labour 
relations abounds in indictments of it, both from the side of labour and of management. 
The main arguments against arbitration were summarized in the excellent brief submitted 
by the Canadian Labour Congress. In the first place, the very existence of arbitration as 
the ultimate solvent tends to impair the bargaining process itself and rob it of meaning. 
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It discourages, in the words of the American économisa Professor George W. Taylor, the 
making of those offers and counter-offers without which thèse is no negotiation. An 
employer will hesitate to make an offer which the union may use not as a starting point 
for agreement but as a springboard for arbitration. A union may well feel that not even 
a so-called final offer should be accepted, since in compulsory arbitration it would not 
likely get less and might get more. The aim of ordinary collective bargaining is to settle 
issues by a meeting of minas. With arbitration looming ahead, however, collective bargaining 
will tend to be a mère intermediate step along the way to the arbitrator's décision. Such 
a décision is not the moral équivalent of an agreement. In the language of the C.L.C.'s 
brief, « I t is not enough to close a dispute. This may simply provide on armistice where a 
peace treaty is required». 
There is also a practical objection to compulosry arbitration. It does not always 
succeed in doing away with strikes; it merely makes them illégal. 
Compulsory arbitration has been assigned a rôle under the Industrial Relations and 
Disputes Investigation Act, but it is the limited one of settling différences conceming the 
meaning or violation of a collective agreement. I t has not been given a place in the forma-
tion of such an agreement, the intent of the législation being that the parties themselves, 
aided where necessary by conciliation machinery, should reach a consensus on wages and 
terms or conditions of employment through the ordinary process of collective bargaining. 
As for the strike or lockout it is important to keep in mind that they are forms of 
action sanctioned by law. Provided there has been compliance with the statutory require-
ments relating to conciliation, management may cause a lockout of employées or employées 
may exercise the right to strike. It is unnecessary to embark upon a considération of the 
strike or lockout in their gênerai aspects, except to say that thèse rights are accepted 
as the calculated risks of a free society. What is of immédiate concern is the wisdom or 
otherwise of making thèse économie sanctions available for the settlement of unresoived 
disputes conceming run-throughs. In terms of the présent law that would mean making them 
available during the closed period, since they are aiready so in the open period. Or it might 
mean the confining of negotiation on run-throughs to the open period only. 
The arguments cited above against compulsory arbitration constitute in a sensé the 
case in favour of strike or lockout action. But there is a case on the other side also. For 
if the parties could resort to économie force during the life of an agreement, the peace 
and stability which such an agreement is designed to produce would be threatened. 
With something to be said for and against both arbitration and économie force, perhaps 
there is a place for both of them in the run-through problem. The Commission feels that 
both can be employed. To better appreciate the rôle which the Commission would assign 
to each of them a few preliminary words of explanation may be helpful. 
Let it be remembered that the protective clause which the Brotherhoods unsuccessfully 
sought for inclusion in the collective agreement stipulated that no material change in 
working conditions should be made except by mutual consent. The word «mater ia l» must 
be especially emphasized. Not every change was feared, but only a material change. 
Admittedly the clause was a product of an âge of technological advance. In such an âge 
and under the spur of scientific progress, innovations might be made of such a character 
as to alter materially the working conditions which were in effect at the time when a 
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collective agreement was entered into. But not every technological advance would hâve this 
effect. The impact of some might be minimal in extent or significance. Thèse would not 
qualify as innovations producing a material change in working conditons, and they could 
accordngly proceed without the need of mutual consent. If this were not so an unnecessary 
restriction would be imposed that could hamstring progress. 
So too with run-throughs. They are not ail equal in their effects. One run-through 
may hâve serious conséquences for an appréciable number of men. Another run-through 
may hâve virtually no impact at ail, or possibly hâve a slight impact on so few men that 
in either case it should not be regarded in the same category as the first one. The first 
materially alters the working conditions which were in effect when the contract was made; 
the second does not. It should not be beyond the capacity of a reasonable and impartial 
mind to décide whether a particular run-through faits into the one class or the other. 
Hère then is the Commission's recommendation in the matter. Run-throughs, as already 
stated, should be negotiated. But in the course of those negotiations either party should 
hâve the right to refer to an arbitrator the question whether the proposed run-through 
falls in the former class or the latter. If the arbitrator should conclude that it is in the latter 
class — that is to say, that its effect is so relatively slight that it cannot fairly be described 
as causing a material change in working conditions — the company would at once be 
entitled to put its run-through plan into effect. If, on the other hand, the arbitrator should 
décide that the impact of the suggested run-through would indeed cause a material change 
in working conditions, the company would be obliged (unless it could secure Brotherhood 
consent) to withdraw its plan until the next open period. A t that open period negotiation 
could proceed subject to the legally available sanction of the strike and lockout. Incidentally, 
a run-through plan which is being established in periodic instalments would hâve to be 
assessed on the basis of its total effect rather than in terms of its individual stages 
considered separately. 
It will be seen that the rôle proposed for arbitration is a very restricted one. The 
arbitrator would not enter the arena of collective bargaining. His sole function would be 
to assess the effect of the company's plan upon the working conditions of the men, with a 
view to determining whether such effect would be material or otherwise. The mechanism 
of this limited form of arbitration is recommended by the Commission in order that the 
company should not be unduly impeded in establishing a run-through whose impact on 
working conditions would be insignificant. I t is quite possible, one should add, that resort 
to arbitration would in actual practice not be necessary, at least in a clear case where the 
effect of a run-through could be seen to be minimal, in such a case the very existence of 
this machinery of arbitration might itself be a factor inducing agreement by the parties. 
On the other hand any run-through which causes material changes in working conditions 
should be negotiated under circumstances where both sides corne to the conférence table 
with their power and strength unimpaired. Under the law as it stands at présent the discus-
sion of a proposed run-through cornes at a time when management has the right to change 
working conditions in any mander not in violation of the agreement, but the men hâve not 
the right to resort to économie force. The recommendation is intended to do away with 
this inequality and put the parties on a basis of parity. Again in actual practice resort to 
the mechanism hère recommended might not be necessary. For one thing the company 
might well begin to introduce its run-through plans during the open period, since the 
présent advantages of introducing them in the closed period would no longer be available 
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to it. Then too, even if a run-through plan were introduced in the closed period, agreement 
upon it might be reached without the necessity of deferring negotiations to the next open 
period. The company might wish to avoid such delay; it would fully understand that when 
the open period arrived both parties would be able to negotiate from strength ; therefore, 
it might say, let the negotiation of the run-through go ahead at once on the same basis 
as it would inevitably hâve to be conducted later. The resuit accordingly would be genuine 
negotiation of run-throughs — not the restricted form of discussion between unequals which 
exists today. 
So much for the Commission's recommendation in terms of principle. A word must be 
added on the matter of détail or mechanics for giving effect to that principle. 
Beyond doubt the simplest and most effective method for that purpose would be 
voluntary agreement between the parties. If the company and the Brotherhoods could agrée 
on a clause providing for no material change in working conditions without mutual consent, 
the objective of the recommendation would be substantially achieved. Till now they hâve 
been unable to agrée. It may be, however, that agreement is still possible, especially in the 
light of intervening events. 
Assuming that agreement can not be reached, législation would be required to give 
effect to the recommendation. The Commission hère sets forth certain matters that would 
hâve to be taken into account in that regard. The first is notice. Since this would no longer 
be notice that a run-through was being established on a named date but rather notice 
prelimany to negotiation, it would not need to be of great length. The Commission believes 
that 30 days' notice would be ample. The notice should, of course, be accompanied by 
adéquate détails of the company's proposai. 
The right of arbitration, for a limited purpose, has been suggested. In the view of the 
Commission the arbitration function, if invoked at ail, should be performed by a single 
arbitrator. He should be agreed upon by the parties, or failing agreement, should be 
designated by the Minister of Labour. 
Finally there is the matter of negotiating the run-through on the basis of parity. The 
recommendation contemplâtes the déferrai of negotiations to the next open period, unless 
the Brotherhoods otherwise consent. What législative instrument should be utilized to give 
effect to the recommendation ? Two vehicles possibly available for that purpose are the 
Railway Act and the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act. The former is of 
spécial concern to the railroad industry, while the latter is of more gênerai application. 
If the Railway Act were used, an amendment incorporating the Commission's recom-
mendation would necessarily be expressed in language appropriate to the spécifie railway 
situation. If, on the other hand, the amendment were sought through the Industrial 
Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, i t could and would be expressed in more gênerai 
terms. For example, the principle embodied in Sub-section 2 of Section 22 of the I.R.D.I. 
Act could be adapted and applied. That Sub-section contains the sole exception to the 
rule forbidding strikes and lockouts during the closed period. It provided that parties may 
by their collective agreement reserve a particular issue for later considération, and still 
retain the right of strike or lockout with respect to a settlement on that issue, after com-
pliance with the compulsory conciliation provisions of the Act. Similarly it would be possible 
to provide, by an appropriate amendment, that any technological innovation, development, 
or change proposed by the employer which would materially and adversely affect the working 
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conditions of the employées should either be deferred for negotiation at the next open 
period, or be dealt with in the same way as if i t were a provision failing within the scope 
of Sub-section 2 of Section 22 of the Act. Amendment through the Industria! Relations and 
Disputes Investigation Act would hâve the advantage of closing a gap in the statute which 
technological advance has revealed. 
It remains only to add that the Commission does not go bail for the spécifie language 
which was employed above in its suggestion of the kind of amendment which might be made. 
Nor does it conceive it to be part of its function to draft the suggested amendment in 
précise légal form. That task can be better performed by appropriate law officers of the 
Crown possessing spécial skills in that area. 
Obligations Resulting from Run-throughs 
53. The Commission is of the view that an obligation rests upon the company to take 
reasonable steps towards minimizing the adverse effects which a run-through may hâve 
upon its employées. That obligation has its root in the principle that when a technological 
change is introduced the cost of reasonable proposais to protect employées from its adverse 
conséquences is a proper charge against its benefits and savings. Apart from the advantage 
of expediting traffic the company's run-through program would yield monetary savings of 
nearly a million dollars a year. I t is proper that the cost of protective measures for 
employées hurt by the run-through should be charged against the savings resulting from 
it. Admittedly this would reduce those savings, but only at the beginning, for the savings 
would be recurring while the protective costs would not. 
54. On the issue of providing compensation for losses on real estate the Commission 
has reached the conclusion that the company's présent policy is unsuited to the contemporary 
industrial scène. A technological advance whose benefits accrue to the employer but whose 
burdens fall on the employée is unacceptable in a society which is concerned about human 
welfare. 
The Commission accordingly recommends that any employée who is requirecl to change 
his place of résidence as a resuit of a run-through should be compensated by the company 
for financial loss suffered in the sale of his home for less than its fair value. Fair value 
should be determined as of a date sufficiently prior to the announcement of the run-through 
to be unaffected thereby. Any dispute on value should be resolved by a majority décision 
of an evaluating committee of three persons, one designated by the company, a second 
designated by the employée or his authorized représentative, and the third designated by 
the two first named. The company should in every case hâve a right in priority to anyone 
else to purchase the home at its fair value as so determined. 
If the dislocated employée is not a home owner but occupies his résidence under an 
unexpired lease he should be protected by the company from monetary loss arising from 
the need to termina te it. 
55. On the issue of moving costs arising from run-throughs the Commission recom-
mends that moving privilèges for household goods be on a door-to-door rather than, as now, 
on a station-to-station basis. 
56. Run-throughs would make some jobs redundant. The question of severance pay 
accordingly arises for men who are not continued in the company's employ after the run-
throughs hâve gone into effect. 
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In the view of the Commission severance pay should be available to employées who 
cease to be employed by the company as a resuit of the institution of a run-through. As to 
the manner in which that right should be given practical expression the Commission believes 
there is guidance in a hitherto unused statute, namely, the Canadian National—Canadian 
Pacific Act. That statute, enacted in 1933, was designed to effect économies and more 
remunerative opération of the two railway Systems by the adoption of coopérative measures, 
plans, and arrangements between them. In 1939 the Act was amended to provide for severance 
pay, or alternatively for a lump sum séparation allowance. 
The coopérative measures, plans, or arrangements between the two railway Systems to 
effect économies and more remunerative opérations were never undertaken. What has 
happened instead is that économies and more remunerative opérations hâve been independently 
sought by the railways through the médium of technology. Is it fair that the protection 
which an employée would hâve had under coopération should be denied him under 
dieselization ? In the Commission's view an employée who has served the company for at 
least one year and who loses his employment with the company by reason of a run-through 
should be entitled to receive severance pay or a lump sum séparation allowance along the 
lines set forth in the C.N.-C.P. Act. (See p. 107 of this Report) 
57. Protection of employées of the company is one thing; protection of communities 
is quite another. What obligation, if any, does the company owe to them? 
The Commission knows of no ground of company responsibility to communities other 
than that of good corporate citizenship, a ground which Canadian National itself acknow-
ledges. It has no basis in law, it is unenforceable, and it has very distinct limits. But in the 
concept of a good society it does exist, and it can function as an operating principle. 
58. The Commission agrées with Canadian National that the translation of the duty 
of good corporate citizenship into action requires particular attention to certain spécifie 
matters. Timing is one. The extent of the impact on a community becomes a major factor 
in determining the time when a technological or organizational change should be introduced. 
Phasing is another. To enable a community to adjust to the effects of change and to reduce 
as much as possible the impact upon it, the program should be introduced in graduai stages 
spread over as long a time as possible. A further matter is advance notice. It is désirable 
that communities be given as much advance notice as possible of décisions likely to affect 
them. Finally technical assistance to the community should be provided. This may take 
various forms, such as cooperating with town officiais in efforts to attract new industry 
to the town, as well as preparing industrial surveys of the town's facilities and commercial 
potentialities. 
59. Canadian National cites its conduct at Stratford, Ontario, when it was decided 
to close the motive power shop there. The Commission agrées that the company may point 
with pride to its relations with the community of Stratford. But its relations with Nakina 
and with Biggar, as the Commission earlier indicated, entitle it to less appiause. This is not 
a criticism of the company's policy but rather of the fact that in the 1964 run-through 
situation the policy was not applied in the same spirit or with the same care as it had 
been at Stratford. 
Perhaps this was due to the fact that, at least with regard to run-throughs, two 
contradictory policies of the company were warring for supremacy. One was the policy of 
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giving advance notice to communities and keeping them closely informed of the company's 
plans. There was, however, another. I t was a policy of silence, and it was deliberately 
adopted because of the belief that early communication with communities would simply 
stir up agitation, unrest, fears, and protests. Under this second policy the company would 
withhold announcement of its plans until comporatively shortiy before it had definitely 
determined to put them into effect. In the Commission's view the second policy, that of 
silence, is wrong. Communities likely to be affected by company action are already appre-
hensive, whether informed by the company or not. The Commission accordingly expresses its 
approval of the first policy, its disapproval of the second. 
60. Canadian National accepts the duty of good corporate citizenship, and its published 
policy statements show that it understands its dimensions and how it may be carried out. 
If the company's performance keeps pace with its officially declared objectives communities 
will hâve little cause for complaint. 
61. It should not be thought that labour stands free of any obligation to communities. 
Good union citizenship is no less requisite than the corresponding duty placed upon corpora-
tions. It involves a récognition that change is a law of life and that stubborn résistance 
to technological advance hurts everyone, labour included. What is required therefore is 
coopération, adaptation, and adjustability. Towards communities this may entail a greater 
willingness on the part of the Brotherhoods to accommodate themselves to the exigencies 
of a run-through program that has been established. Complaint was expressed in the brief 
of the Sioux Lookout Chamber of Commerce that the engine crew Brotherhoods showed 
inadéquate concern for the interests of Sioux Lookout when 34 of their members moved from 
that town to Winnipeg at the time of the 1960 Redditt run-through. That complaint has 
some merit, the Commission believes. 
There is a further area in which union conduct could be of assistance not only as 
regards communities but also gêneraily. This relates to the matter of seniority. Some 
références to its opération suggest that it contains certain rigidities. Hère is something 
which can be dealt with only on the initiative of the Brotherhoods themselves. I t is the 
Commission's recommendation that the Brotherhoods should survey the seniority System by 
which their men are governed, with a view to introducing a greater degree of flexibility in 
it, consistent with the gênerai purpose which that System is designed to serve. 
62. It may not always be enough to rely on good corporate citizenship and good 
union citizenship alone. They may need some reinforcement. That reinforcement would hâve 
to corne from government. 
If a town collapses because of a lost market for the product of its only industry, or if 
the resource upon which its life dépends is exhausted, government responsibility for taking 
appropriate remédiai action is usually taken for granted. A similar responsibility should be 
assigned to it when adverse effects on a community resuit or are likely to resuit from 
changes in plant or personnel for the less dramatic but equally understandable reason of 
industrial efficiency. The Commission has no difficulty in declaring that there is a govern-
ment obligation towards communities whose existence or stability is threatened by a run-
through or its conséquences. 
63. Concerning the manner in which this obligation to communities should be discharged, 
two distinct stages of the run-through problem must be noted. The first occurs when a run-
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through is to be instituted ; the second arises after the run-through has been put into 
effect. The problems associated with each stage are différent. 
64. Factors to be considered in the first stage are notice and adéquate time for 
adjustment. The Commission has already recommended the giving of 30 days' notice by the 
company to the Brotherhoods as a prélude to negotiation. It would seem appropriate that 
a similar notice be given by the company to the proper officer of the affected community 
or communities. The Commission recommends that within this 30-day period the community 
should hâve the right to apply to the Board of Transport Commissioners for Canada for a 
hearing upon the company's run-through proposai. 
The essential purpose of such a hearing would be to consider whether the company's 
proposed timing and phasing of its plan were reasonable or not. The Board would consider 
the probable impact on the community of the proposed run-through with a view to deter-
mining not if the run-through should be introduced at ail but rather how and when i t should 
be introduced. Upon the hearing the Board would be empowered to do one of three things. 
It could, first of ail, direct that the company's plan proceed as scheduled. Presumably i t 
would so act in those cases where it felt either that the impact on a community would be 
slight or that everything possible was being done to reduce its effects to the minimum. 
Secondly, it could direct that the plan proceed as scheduled but with modifications. Thirdly, 
the Board could direct that the run-through be delayed in whole or in part for such time as 
it thought f i t and that it be instituted at the end of that time. In an appropriate case 
it could also order that after the lapse of the period of delay the matter be reconsidered. 
What is the position if the Board follows the third course and ordërs delay? I t would 
be unfair to the company if it had to forfeit the monetary advantage it would hâve obtained 
had its run-through proposai gone ahead as planned. If public policy requires delay, public 
policy should pay for that delay. In practical terms this means that the company should be 
reimbursed from Fédéral public funds for such pecuniary loss as i t is compelled to sustain 
because of compliance with the Board's order imposing delay; and the Commission recom-
mends accordingly. Such reimbursement would in no manner be a « subsidy » to the com-
pany, since if left free to introduce the change on its own initiative and meet the costs 
associated therewith it would reap a benefit equal to the calculated payment. 
The Commission has suggested the Board of Transport Commissioners for Canada as the 
body to deal with thèse applications by communities. There is another body, not yet formally 
established, which might be alternatively considered for that purpose — namely, the proposed 
Branch Line Rationalization Authority recommended in the Report of the Royal Commission 
on Transportation. If so, it would perhaps be désirable to change its name from Branch Line 
Rationalization Authority to Railway Rationalization Authority, or some other more gênerai 
désignation 
65. After a run-through has been instituted there would still be a responsibility on 
the part of the nation towards an affected community. That responsibility would arise both 
at the Provincial and the Fédéra! level. Référence has already been made to the rôle that 
government must play in developing effective employment and manpower policies to reduce 
rhe disruptive effects which technological changes may bring. One spécifie function that 
government can perform is to cooperate with the municipal authorities in efforts to find an 
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alternative industry to fill the gap created by the run-through. The industrial development 
and research facilities possessed by govemment could certainly be put to use for that purpose. 
66. There is no certainty, however, that a suitable alternative industry would be found 
for the town. Indeed it is simple realism to accept the fact that in sonne cases this will 
not be possible. In such circumstances it would be idle for govemment to seek by artificial 
supports to maintain the town at its former level. Far better instead to recognize that the 
town may hâve to occupy a smaller constituent place in the life of the nation. To ease 
the transition to that smaller rôle govemment can still do several things. Action to place 
the town's municipal or debenture debt on a more realistic and équitable level would not be 
beyond the compétence of the Province concemed. Then, too, wise policies at both the 
national and local level of retraining and resettlement — marked by adéquate moving and 
relocation allowances — would be of great assistance to those individuais whose économie 
future in the town has been extinguished by the operating change. 
67. The Commission has hère assigned to the company, the unions, and the nation 
some degree of responsibility for the welfare of communities. That responsibility, however, 
has limits. I t does not in any sensé require the perpétuation of the community in its existing 
state. Regrettably such a condition cannot be guaranteed. For what is involved is a conflict 
of rights — the right of the company to institute change in the interests of efficiency and 
economy ; the right of the community to carry on as it was — and the need to secure 
the most équitable reconciliation between them. To say that the community must never 
become the subject of a run-through would be a déniai of the rights of the company. It 
would also be economically wasteful. A community whose status is dépendent on obsolète 
technology cannot rightfully expect to be perpetuated for ail time and at any cost. Hence, 
in suggesting safeguards for communities, the Commission^ purpose has been not to prevent 
run-throughs but only to delay them for a reasonable period to allow for adjustment to their 
effects. 
One furthur matter must be considered, even if only briefly. The Commission's terms 
of référence require it to report its findings on and recommendations for application not 
only to the industrial situation affecting the two terminais of Nakina and Wainwright but 
also « for gênerai application to similar situations arising in future». What do the quoted 
words mean ? 
Two views were pressed upon the Commission. One was that the words admitted only 
cf a narrow construction, and that « similar situations » could accordingly mean similar run-
throughs and nothing else. The other view was that the words could and should be given 
a broader construction, and that while they certainly included run-throughs they also 
embraced other situations similar in their gênerai nature and effect. The Commission prefers 
the second view. The relationship between run-throughs and technology has been repeatedly 
stressed throughout this Report. The Commission believes there is such a relationship. To 
say that nothing hère written can hâve application to technological changes other than run-
throughs would be to deny the existence of that relationship. The Commission does not 
believe that its terms of référence oblige it to ignore the context in which the run-through 
problem is situated and from which it emerged. Its report accordingly is intended to apply 
not only to run-throughs but also, wherever it can be so applied, to similar situations in 
gênerai. To predict what such similar situations might be and how they might in the future 
I N F O R M A T I O N S 299 
Grise would, however, be a periious adventure which the Commission does not feel caited 
upon to undertake. 
One last word. The findings and conclusions of the Commission hâve sometimes favoured 
one side, sometimes the other. Neither the company nor the Brotherhoods hâve escaped 
criticism. Even the law has been criticized and found to need correction. What happens 
now ? Much will dépend on the company and the Brotherhoods, the two parties who played 
the central rôles in the controversy. Each must be prepared to yield something \n the 
interests of future industrial peace. The company must adjust to the idea, unpalatable 
perhaps but necessary, that run-throughs should be negotiated. The Brotherhoods must give 
up any notion that run-throughs are improper and should approach the negotiation of them 
with reason and responsibility. In that spirit of coopération and mutual trust the cause of 
the company, the men, and the nation can be properly served and advanced. 
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